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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFON  
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT : NIE-29/2: Review of NIE-29, "Probability of  
an Attack on Yugoslavia in 1951"

1. Suggested terms of reference for subject estimate are enclosed for your consideration.

2. It is requested that your representative be prepared to meet in Room 146 South Building at 2:30 Wednesday, 12 August to discuss these terms, at which time production responsibilities will also be allocated.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 September 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-29/2: PROBABILITY OF A  
COMMUNIST INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA (For con-  
sideration by the IAC Representatives)

REFERENCE: NIE-29, 20 March 1951  
NIE-29/1, 4 May 1951

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probability of a Communist invasion of  
Yugoslavia.

SCOPE

This study should review the intelligence indications,  
positive and negative, since May 1951, of a possible Soviet/  
Satellite attack on Yugoslavia. In addition, the following  
three major factors should be re-examined to determine if  
they alter the conclusions of NIE-29 and 29/1: (a) the de-  
velopment of the Satellite forces; (b) the development of

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Yugoslav relations with the West; and (c) the internal stability of Yugoslavia.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. WHAT INDICATIONS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA BY THE USSR AND/OR THE SATELLITES HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE 1 MAY (date of NIE-29/1)?
- II. WHAT CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET/SATELLITE CAPABILITIES FOR AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA?
  - A. Are the military programs of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania designed for aggressive purposes against Yugoslavia, and do the tempo and scale of those programs have a direct bearing on the possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia?
  - B. Are the Satellite forces now trained and equipped for action independent of Soviet forces, and are they trained for coordinated action with each other?
  - C. Has there been any significant build-up of Soviet forces in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia?

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III. WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN YUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES TO  
RESIST A SOVIET/SATELLITE ATTACK?

- A. Has Western economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia to date materially enhanced Yugoslav capabilities to resist a Soviet/Satellite attack?
- B. What effect will projected Western economic and military aid have on Yugoslav capabilities to resist?
- C. Do the Yugoslavs view their relations with the West, particularly the US, as sufficiently close as to constitute a guarantee of Western assistance in the event of an attack?

IV. IS THE TITO REGIME THREATENED BY INTERNAL INSTABILITY?

- A. Do current personnel shifts, purges, and charges of "Cominformism" within the Yugoslav Government and Communist party reflect any basic instability of the Tito regime?
  - 1. How far up do these actions extend in the governmental and party hierarchies?
  - 2. To what extent are they related to Tito's efforts to improve relations with the West and to institute limited reforms within the government?

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3. To what extent is the charge of "Cominformism" used to cover other charges such as inefficiency, graft, failures in Party discipline, etc?
  4. Do these recent instances indicate increased effectiveness of Soviet/Satellite propaganda or subversive activities within Yugoslavia?
- B. How serious are Tito's internal difficulties stemming from local problems rather than ideological differences?
1. How effectively has Tito controlled the national and religious rivalries of Yugoslavia and what are the prospects for effective control in the future?
  2. How serious is the peasant problem and what are the prospects for an effective solution?
  3. Are there any effective non-Communist opposition groups within the country and, in view of the limitation on totalitarian methods which Tito's relations with the West will probably impose, are any such groups likely to develop?
- C. Are opposition elements within Yugoslavia, either Communist or non-Communist, likely to overthrow the Tito regime?

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V. WHAT ARE PROBABLE SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA?

- A. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the likelihood of the overthrow of the Tito regime by internal forces, either pro-Cominform or non-Communist?
- B. What is the probable Soviet estimate of Satellite effectiveness in an attack on Yugoslavia?
  - 1. Could the Satellite armies alone defeat Yugoslavia?
  - 2. If not, what degree of Soviet support and/or participation would be required?
- C. Would the Kremlin estimate that Yugoslav ties with the West are sufficiently close that an attack on Yugoslavia would probably result in Western intervention, thus greatly increasing the risk of general war?
- D. What is the relative likelihood of a Soviet/Satellite attack on Yugoslavia? Has the possibility increased or decreased since preparation of NIE-29 and 29/1?

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